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SYMPOSIUM: PART II

CHANGING THE RULES: SHOULD COURTS
LIMIT THE POWER OF COMMON INTEREST
COMMUNITIES TO ALTER UNIT OWNERS'
PRIVILEGES IN THE FACE OF VESTED
EXPECTATIONS?
Patrick A. Randolph, Jr.*
Do persons investing in common interest communities
have a legally enforceable expectation that aspects of the
community in existence when they invest will not change
without their consent? Should they have this expectation?
This article addresses these questions by exploring a number
of common areas of dispute changed situations in common interest communities. The initial purpose of the inquiry is to
determine whether courts recognize any protection against
change.' Where decisions providing protection appear, the
inquiry turns to whether these protections relate to the nature of the change itself, to the method in which the change
was implemented, or to some broader theory of judicial review the governance systems of common interest communities.2
Not surprisingly, this inquiry, did not produce consistent
results. With regard to virtually every change chosen for
study, research revealed cases in which courts had recognized and protected a vested expectation.3 With possibly one
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) School
of Law. The author is also the Executive Director of the Joint Editorial Board
on Uniform Real Property Acts, a group related to the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, promulgators of the Uniform Common
Interest Ownership Act and other uniform laws affecting common interest
communities. The author acknowledges the support of the UMKC Law Foundation in providing a summer research grant during the preparation of this article.
1. See infra Part I.
2. See infra Part II.
3. See, e.g., Breene v. Plaza Tower Ass'n, 310 N.W.2d 730 (N.D. 1981).
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exception, however, the majority of cases in each area provide incomplete protection from change. In most areas the
common interest governance was afforded considerable
power to implement change." In some cases, the breakdown
into separate classes of change yielded surprising results.
Based upon a very small sample, courts have been more inclined, for instance, to recognize a vested interest in allowing
pets, than they have been in allowing children.5 Other results were less surprising. Courts appeared far more likely
to reject changes that involved potential special privileges for
individuals than they were to reject changes applicable to the
entire population of unit owners. This was true regardless of
whether some of those owners were adversely affected. 6
Similarly, results were somewhat inconsistent regarding
whether the context of the decision matters. Some jurisdictions were far more permissive when the change was implemented by a vote of unit owners, rather than when it was by
an elected association board of directors or some equivalent
representative group.' Most who recognized a protected expectation interest at all, however, seemed prepared to recognize it, to some degree, despite voted changes.8
Considerable discussion concerning theories of judicial
review of association decision making, is evident in case law
and commentaries. An analysis of these differing theories
yield, for the most part, no difference in the degree to which
each of theory would affect protection of vested expectations.
The method of protection, however, may be affected by the
applicable legal theory.9
Whether, and to what extent, vested expectations ought
to be protected once identified depends, to a certain extent,
on the balance of community values and concerns of individual freedom. This article concludes that courts not generally
inclined to overturn association decision making should nevertheless provide protection for perceived vested expectations, while still permitting common interest associations to
make their own decisions and to establish cooperative and
4. See, e.g., id.
5. See infra Part I.A.
6. See, e.g., Zent v. Morrow, 476 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
7. See Couch v. Southern Methodist Univ., 10 S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1928). See generally infra Part I.
8. See infra Part I.
9. See infra Part IV.
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uniformly controlled communities." The device to accomplish
this is neither new nor extraordinary; it simply takes legitimate vested expectation considerations into account in fashioning a remedy. In this way, courts can recognize the community's general right of self-determination, avoid economic
windfalls to individual unit owners who wish to avoid the
community's general policies, and fashion individual compromises to ease the burden of being out of step.
I. WHAT CONSTITUTES "CHANGING THE DEAL?"

Defining the scope of inquiry for this research required
an exercise of judgment as to what types of association decision making might be viewed as a true alteration of the
original expectations of the parties. There is room here, of
course, for significant disagreement. What may be a cataclysmic development to one unit owner might be the normal
working out of a preexisting scheme for another. Obviously,
courts that hold that a given association rule is completely
consistent with the overall theme of the community, to which
all residents have subscribed, are unlikely to take seriously
the objections of a unit owner whose vested expectations
have been frustrated.
One case which confronted this issue directly was
Beachwood Villas Condominium v. Poor." The association
board, without unit owner approval, adopted a policy detailing significant limitations on the rights of unit owners to rent
their apartments. 2 The court did not indicate whether any
limitation existed prior to that time. 3 The declaration did
not address whether unit owners were prohibited from renting their units. It stated only that "[t]he Board of Directors
may, from time to time, adopt or amend previously adopted
rules and regulations governing and restricting the use and
maintenance of condominium units .... ."' The court considered a challenge to the board's leasing restrictions based specifically on the argument that the board lacked the authority
to adopt such rules under the very general language of the

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See infra Part IV.
448 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 143-44.
Id.
Id. at 1144.
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"use and maintenance" rubric contained in the declaration. 1
The court rejected the position of an earlier Florida court
which held that "use restrictions, to be valid, must be clearly
inferable [sic] from the Declaration." 6 Instead, the Beechwood court concluded that any use regulation that does not
expressly contravene an express provision of the declaration
or a right reasonably inferable therefrom, was within the discretion of the board. 7 The court explained that a declaration
is unlikely to provide clear direction concerning the myriad of
use issues that a board is likely to consider: "[p]arking regulations, limitations on the use of the swimming pool, tennis
court and card room - the list is endless and subject to constant modification. 8
The logical result of the court's analysis would be that
virtually any use restriction would not be viewed as a
"change in the deal." Further, if the declaration could
be
read to authorize other discretionary judgments by the association board, those judgments also would not be viewed as
changes regardless of their content. This view of the common
interest ownership agreement goes too far.
Of course, the court was accurate in pointing out that the
complexities of common interest ownership, particularly condominium ownership, are such that it would be impossible to
address each of the myriad of issues that necessarily come
within the jurisdiction of the association board."' The conclusion that courts, therefore, should abdicate the responsibility
of identifying areas of regulation that go beyond the expectation of unit owners, however, is neither necessary nor appropriate. ° The court allowed for the fact that some determinations might implicitly contravene the declaration.
Its

15. Id. at 1145. In Beachwood, it is unclear who the parties challenging the
rules were. It can be assumed, however, they were unit owners who argued
they had a vested expectation that the leasing policies would not be altered.
16. Beachwood Villas Condominium v. Poor, 448 So. 2d 1143, 1144 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984). As authority for this rejected proposition, the court cited
to Mavrakis v. Playa Del Sol Ass'n, 353 So. 2d 598 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
17. Beachwood, 448 So. 2d at 1145. Note that the court preserves the issue
as to whether the court could review the board's exercise of discretion to
"reasonableness." The court indicated that the reasonableness of the restrictions themselves was not at issue; only whether the board had authority to enact them. Id. at 1144.
18. Id. at 1145.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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holding-that substantially limiting rental of units is within
board discretion21-suggests that there are few aspects of

private ownership of a common interest unit that are not
subject to change.
Although it is true that no exact test can be formulated,
there are clearly expectations that unit owners have when
they invest. For instance, the law generally places a high
value on freedom of alienation of real property, and normally
construes broadly any legal instrument broadly in favor of
protecting such alienability.22 Thus, the ability to rent one's
unit in a common interest association ought to be viewed as
one of the most fundamental of buyers' expectations. The
right to house one's family is another fundamental expectation. The fact that the drafters of the declaration did not set
forth a "unit owner's bill of rights" listing all the expectations
to which unit owners were entitled, may be a reflection of the
drafters' assumption that such expectations need not be
stated, rather than a statement that all issues are open to
the change.
The numerous cases cited below demonstrate that many
unit owners expect protection from subsequent action by
common interest associations. Although courts have not always agreed, the principle of protected property interests inherent in unit ownership is well established.
Selected for research in this article are several different
areas that commonly fall into dispute: (1) age restrictions,
(2) leasing restrictions, (3) pet restrictions, and (4) building
restriction. These areas do not exhaust the field, but are
adequate to permit an examination of how courts balance
unit owner's expectations against community controls.
Although the issues addressed in this article are similar
to the fundamental question posed in the Beachwood Villas
litigation, the context here is broader. The Beachwood Villas
case assumed that there were certain areas of regulation that
could not be changed by action of the association board, but
the court implied that these areas, nevertheless, could be
changed by vote of the unit owners. 3 The inquiries in this
21. Beachwood Villas Condominium v. Poor, 448 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
840 (1998)
22. RICHARD R. POWELL, 10 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY
[hereinafter 10 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY].
23. Id. at 1145. One should leave open the possibility that a "super major-
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article are whether there are, and whether there should be,
protected expectations of unit owners that even a majority
vote to amend the bylaws or declaration could not change.
II.

RESTRICTIONS ON USE

A. Age Restrictions
Restrictions on children residing in common interest
communities raise obvious and significant policy issues.
What concern of a homeowner could be more fundamental
than the right to have a family in the home? When one acquires a home without restrictions against occupancy by
children, shouldn't it be to assumed that this could be a family home?
The common law answer to the latter question is clouded
by the fact that federal fair housing laws now significantly
restrict the power of an association to discriminate against
families with children.24 Associations now attempting to enforce age restrictions involving children will find themselves
unsuccessful25 and potentially liable for significant damage
claims.26 Consequently, it is difficult to gauge the current
view of the courts as to the power of an association to change
rules on occupancy by children.
Court decisions in the 1970s and 1980s, prior to the
adoption of the federal prohibitions, indicate that the courts
ity" of the unit owners, if authorized by the declaration, could make more extensive changes than would otherwise be permitted. This would be a practical
accommodation to the fact that changed circumstances may dictate a need for
revised rules, coupled with a recognition that the need for change ought to be
widely although not necessarily universally recognized.
24. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994).
25. See Simovits v. Chanticleer Condominium Ass'n, 933 F. Supp. 1394
(N.D. Ill. 1996). Simovits is particularly instructive because the plaintiff unit
owner bought with full knowledge of the restriction in question, based upon a
prepurchase meeting with an association committee that explained the rules
directly. The plaintiff had even run for the association board on a platform
suggesting that "I like Chanticleer as an adult community and would like to
keep it that way." Id. at 1397. See also Martin v. Palm Beach Atlantic Ass'n
696 So. 2d 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (finding a prima facie violation of the
Act when the Association failed to amend its rules to remove a prohibition
against children and distributed copies of these rules, even though it did not
enforce them).
26. Chanticleer awarded an injunction, actual damages, and punitive damages to individual homeowners and a housing advocacy group, plus litigation
costs. 933 F. Supp. at 1408. Other tort damages, such as emotional distress
damages, are also available. See Martin, 696 So. 2d at 923.
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were disposed to permit associations to change the rules in
this area, despite expectations of existing unit owners.27 Restrictions against children reflect the values of a certain class
of purchasers in common interest communities-retirees and
These restrictions existed quite commonly
"empty nesters.
in housing developments in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly
in areas favored by retirees and "empty nesters.""9 In a number of cases, courts upheld such restrictions against objections that they restrained alienation of the property, violated
religious freedoms, or were so repugnant to social values as
to be unenforceable as a matter of public policy. 3o
Only a few court decisions involved rules that were
changed to restrict the age of residents after an affected
owner purchased a unit.3 In each of them, the courts upheld
the change. 2 For instance, in Everglades Plaza Condominium Ass'n v. Buckner," the association amended its declaration to restrict occupancy by children following the plaintiffs
acquisition of his unit, but prior to his remarriage and acqui27. See infra note 28.
28. These values are reflected in the fact that associations that have characteristics suggesting that they are primarily communities for persons over age
fifty-five, may be exempt from the requirements of the federal law. See 42
U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(c) (1994); see also Note, Judicial Review of Condominium
Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 647 (1981) [hereinafter Condominium Rulemaking]; WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUMS & HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS § 7.40, at
167-69 (1985) [hereinafter HYATT, HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS].
29. See Condominium Rulemaking, supra note 28; HYATT, HOMEOWNER
ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 28, § 7.40, at 167-69.
30. See, e.g., Constellation Condominium Ass'n, v. Harrington, 467 So. 2d
378 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (condominium association rules); Preston Tower
Condominium Ass'n v. S.B. Realty, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. App. 1985)
(condominium association declaration); Riley v. Stoves, 526 P.2d 747 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1974) (mobile home subdivision declaration).
31. Hill v. Fontaine Condominium Ass'n, 334 S.E.2d 690, 691 (Ga. 1985). In
Hill, plaintiff unit owner had purchased his unit when his building was

"converted" from rentals to condominium units. At the time of purchase, there
was no age restriction in the declaration.

At a subsequent meeting which he

attended, the association adopted an age restriction on residency. The plaintiff
had voted against the restriction, although he had no children at the time.
When his wife gave birth to a son, the association demanded that they move.
Plaintiffs primary allegation was that the restriction restrained the alienability
of his property. The court rejected the claim, holding that the restriction "is
not so unusual nor so unreasonable as to be "repugnant to the estate granted."

Id.
32. Id. In Hill, the plaintiff did not expressly raise the question of the
authority of the association to change the rules to implement an age restriction.

Id.
33. 462 So. 2d 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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sition of a ten year old stepson. 4 The stepfather argued that
the association could not alter his rights in this area following the acquisition of his unit."5 The trial court found the
provisions ambiguous, and refused to enforce them against
plaintiffs stepson.36 The appeals court reversed, finding that
the amendment unambiguous and, therefore, valid.37 The
court cited language in the declaration similar to that found
in a Florida statute permitting amendment to declarations by
less than 100% of the unit owners. 8 It is important to note,
however, that the court pointed out that the situation before
it, was "altogether different from the parent who has a child
already permanently living with him at the time of an
amendment barring children."3 9 The court did not say why
such situation would be different.
Another Florida case, decided a year after Everglades
but in a different appellate district, may stand for the proposition that restrictions on children cannot be enacted retroactively. The decision gives such little attention to the issue,
however, that it is difficult to make out its significance. In
4 ° the
Constellation Condominium Ass'n v. Harrington,
court
upheld a rule prohibiting permanent occupancy by children
against a couple who acquired their unit with knowledge of
the restriction later had a child.4 1 The court refused to permit the association to enforce an amendment to the association rules that limited the number of days during which a
child under the age of twelve could reside on the premises. 2
The court characterized this as a "retroactive regulation," but
did not otherwise discuss the issue. Apparently, the basic

34. Id. at 836.
35. Everglades Plaza Condominium Ass'n v. Buckner, 462 So. 2d 835 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
36. Id. at 837. A tactic common to most of these cases was to argue that the
terms of the provision were too ambiguous to be enforced. Of course, such an
approach is often palatable to a trial court as it restricts the impact of the decision, and involves no broad policy implications. As indicated, however, the
cases involving age restrictions tend to reject such ploys, at least at the appeals
court level. Id. Accord Constellation Condominiums Ass'n v. Harrington, 467
So. 2d 378, 381-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
37. EvergladesPlaza, 462 So. 2d at 837.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 467 So. 2d 378 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
41. Id. at 383.
42. Id.
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prohibition against children was the crux of the dispute.4 3 It
may be that the Constellation court did not have before it the
Everglades decision when it made its ruling. It is unclear
what the court meant in characterizing the regulation as a
"retroactive regulation.""" It seems likely that the court
would have been concerned if the plaintiffs had a child residing with them at the time that the regulation was enacted.4"
4
In Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condominium Ass'n, " an association amended its bylaws, pursuant to a "super-majority
47
vote" requirement, to restrict occupancy by children. Plaintiff owned a unit in the complex at the time." The complex
was a Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") financed
housing project subject to a HUD Regulatory Agreement.
The bulk of the opinion dealt with the validity of the bylaw
49
The court
change under applicable federal regulations.
respecting
units,
of
use
permitted
the
found that a change in
occupancy by children, was a reasonable and valid action by
the association. °
An intriguing part of the Ritchey decision is the final section dealing with the plaintiffs allegations that the association exceeded the scope of its authority in enacting an age rePlaintiffs alleged that such
striction on occupancy.

43. Id.
44. Id. (citing Winston Towers v. Saverio, 360 So. 2d 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978)). In Winston, the court refused to enforce a restriction on pets or replacements of pets that had not been registered in 1973. 360 So. 2d at 470.
The association had adopted the restriction in 1974, so, in a sense, it was ex
post facto legislation for pets acquired between the 1973 cut-off date and the
1974 rule. Id. Since the complainant's pet did not fall within that class, so it is
difficult to know exactly what the court found as the fatal flaw in the restriction. Id.
45. Constellation Condominium Ass'n v. Harrington, 467 So. 2d 378 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
46. 146 Cal. Rptr. 695 (Ct. App. 1978).
47. Id. at 697.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 700. The court indicated that the applicable federal regulation
purports to convert the prohibition on transfer to families with children into a
"right of first refusal." Id. at 700. In Ritchey, the plaintiff was not attempting
to sell his unit or bring his own children into the unit, but to lease to a family
with children. The court did not indicate whether the association had a right to
lease the property from the plaintiff at the proposed rental rate in order to enforce the restriction against children. Id. at 698.
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restriction was ultra vires.5 ' He argued that the association
was established for the sole purpose of operating and maintaining the common areas and facilities of the project, and
had no power to prescribe the usage of individually owned
units. 2 In a sweeping statement, court disagreed: "The
authority of a condominium association necessarily includes
the power to issue reasonable regulations governing an
owner's use of his unit in order to prevent activities which
might prove annoying to the general residents."53
The court did not provide sufficient text from the declaration or other organic documents to indicate any specific
grant of power to regulate tenant usage. The broad statement by the court however, also found in cases involving
other types of use regulations, clearly indicated an early
trend to approve broad changes in unit owner's privileges of
use, even on matters so fundamental as the housing of one's
own children.
In sum, the cases involving restrictions against children
favored broad association powers of amendment during the
time that such restrictions were permitted as a matter of
federal law. A possible explanation for such outcomes is the
fact that the conflicts tended to arise in associations in which
the overall purpose of the condominium design was to facilitate retirement communities that catered to elderly residents, often a population that has difficulty coexisting with
children. Further, this line of cases ended at a relatively
early point in the evolution of thought regarding amendments to common interest community rules. As such, these
cases may not provide sufficient perspective on the current
thinking of the courts.
On the other hand, the use of one's home to raise children is a fundamental concern. The willingness of courts,
even in the heyday of condominium autonomy, to permit restrictions on such usage, is some evidence that courts are
unwilling to set aside amendments to use restrictions even
where they result in a deprivation of important property expectations. But there remains a suggestion that there is a
51. Id. at 701. "Ultra vires" means "[an act performed without any
authority to act on the subject." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1522 (6th ed. 1990).
52. Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condominium Ass'n, 146 Cal. Rptr. 695, 701 (Ct.
App. 1978).
53. Id. at 701.
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limit on association authority in this area
B. Leasing Restrictions
The ability to lease a residential property when an owner
does not wish to reside there is obviously a significant economic benefit. In the case of properties located in recreational areas an owner might have purchased the unit specifically with leasing in mind. It is not uncommon, however, for
permanent residents of the community to develop interests
antithetical to those of the leased unit owners. Because the
permanent owners are more likely to participate in association politics, conflicts of various sorts arise between these
two ownership groups on such matters as use restrictions
and willingness to commit to higher assessments for maintenance or improvement of association amenities. Such conflicts can lead to permanent residents voting to prohibit the
leasing of units. Where there is experience with unruly
short-term tenants, resident owners may object to short-term
4
vacation rentals while they will tolerate long-term leasing.
Either type of restriction may severely impair the investment expectations of unit owners who wish to rent out
their units. In the case of long term rentals, the sole objective of the unit owner in purchasing the unit might have been
to invest in a rental property. Vacation rentals, on the other
hand, provide the leasing owners with the ability to use their
property when they wish and cover the costs (or even make a
profit) by renting in the "high season." Should these owners
have anticipated that fellow association members might prohibit leasing activities simply because there is a general
power to amend bylaws or to adopt rules concerning "usage?"
There is a stronger argument that leasing restrictions
constitute restraints on alienation than there is for other
forms of use restrictions. In the condominium setting, how-

54. See generally Yogman v. Parrott, 937 P.2d 1019 (Or. 1997). In Yogman,
the Oregon Supreme Court held that short term rentals were not a violation of
a covenant providing that that "all lots... shall be used exclusively for residential purposes and no commercial enterprise shall be constructed or committed
on the property." Id. at 1022. An interesting feature of this case was the
court's determination to return to the traditional rule that restrictive covenants
should be construed narrowly, in favor of broad use privileges. Id. at 1023. The
court rejected a pure "contract theory" approach that had been previously approved in Oregon in Swaggerty v. Peterson, 572 P.2d 1309 (Or. 1977), and, until
recently, had been viewed as the "developing consensus." Id. at 1023.
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ever, courts frequently have found such restrictions justified,
and as therefore permitted relatively broad exercise of
power." Generally speaking, such courts have analyzed the
"reasonableness" of the restrictions, measured in terms of the
breadth and methods of enforcement, court have found no
violation of the policy against restraints on alienation.56
Again, however, some decisions suggest the recognition of
vested expectations that discard protection from change.
Perhaps, it was the concern with traditional values of
alienability of land drove the North Dakota Supreme Court
to issue one of the most sweeping opinions recognizing the
vested rights unit owners have against changes in use controls in common ownership associations.57 In Breene, the
court struck down a commonly adopted amendment to the
bylaws of a condominium prohibiting leasing of units. 8 The
policy included a hardship clause and other special devices to
"soften" its impact." The objections of the court did not address alienability or the fairness of the restriction. Rather
the focus of its conclusion was that the right to lease the unit
was part of the basic "bundle of rights" that unit owners expected to acquire with the purchase of their units." These
expectations were established by the recorded statement of
restrictions in existence at the time of purchase.61 The court
stated that there could be no change that would affect these
expectations." The association argued that the declaration
in existence at the time the units were sold included provisions for its amendment by a vote of three quarters of the
owners. The court responded that such general notice of possible change was not enough: "[K]nowledge of the provisions
for amendment does not, without more, constitute the degree
of knowledge necessary to establish a voluntary and inten55. See, e.g., Le Febvre v. Osterndorf, 275 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979);
Seagate Condominium Ass'n v. Duffy, 330 So. 2d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
56. See, e.g. Seagate, 330 So. 2d at 486-487.
57. Breene v. Plaza Tower Ass'n, 310 N.W.2d 730 (N.D. 1981).
58. Id. at 734-35.
59. Id. at 732. Leases of four months or less were permitted if the owner
occupied the unit for the rest of the year. Existing lease arrangements were
"grandfathered" for their existing term (but could not be renewed or extended).
Unit owners with existing month-to-month arrangements had three months to
end them. Id. at 732.
60. Id. at 734.
61. Id.
62. Breene v. Plaza Tower Ass'n, 310 N.W.2d 730, 734 (N.D. 1981).
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tional relinquishment of the statutory right to notice of a re68
striction prior to the purchase of a condominium unit."
Despite the ringing words indicating that there was an
absolute right to use the condominium as described in the
declaration at time of purchase, the court backed away from
this absolutist position toward the end of its opinion." It
stated that bylaw amendments may be made where the matters covered dealt with items specifically listed in the North
Dakota statute as appropriate for bylaws.65 These included:
"maintenance of common elements, limited elements where
applicable, assessment of expenses, payment of losses, division of profits, disposition of hazard insurance proceeds and
similar matters."6 As the statute did not declare use regulations to be an appropriate subject for bylaws, the court concluded that restrictions on use appearing in the bylaws
should be dealt with as "restrictions" within the meaning of
the North Dakota statute. 7 In its view, "restrictions" could
not be changed by amendment." The fact that the restriction
in question appeared in the bylaws of this particular associaIt was the nature of the restriction made no difference.
tion, not its placement, that determined whether it could be
amended.7 °
Although it may be argued that the Breene decision is
7
driven by the special language of the North Dakota statute,
it represents a philosophical view as to whether condominium unit purchasers have a vested right in their purchase.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 734-35.
68. Breene v. Plaza Tower Ass'n, 310 N.W.2d 730, 735 (N.D. 1981).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. Indeed, the Breene opinion distinguishes three earlier decisions on
the grounds that the statutes in the affected jurisdictions are distinct. Id. at
734 (distinguishing Le Febvre v. Osterndorf, 275 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. App. 1979);
Seagate Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v Duffy, 330 So. 2d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976); Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condominium Ass'n, 146 Cal. Rptr. 695 (Ct. App.
1978)). In Florida, for instance, the Seagate court pointed out the statute read
that "an amendment of a declaration shall become effective when recorded according to law." Breene, 310 N.W.2d at 734 (citing Seagate Condominium
Ass'n, Inc. v Duffy, 330 So. 2d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)). As a result, Seagate Condominium Ass'n, a Florida case authorizing an amendment to restrict
leasing, was considered irrelevant by the Breene court. Breene, 310 N.W.2d at
734.
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This appears to be the construction of the case by the Minnesota court of appeals in Breezy Point Holiday HarborLodgeBeachside Apartment Owners' Ass'n,72 which construed
Breene as holding that owners had vested rights that could
not be compromised notwithstanding that the operative declarations provided for amendment.7" The Minnesota court, in
dicta, rejected this viewpoint, citing cases in Florida74 and
California."5 It should be noted, however, that the operative
statutes in those states, as well as the Minnesota statute,
were specific in providing for amendments to a condominium
declaration.
Seagate Condominium Ass'n v. Duffy,76 precedent relied
upon by the Breezy Point court, provided a specific rationale
for leasing restrictions; it balanced that rationale against the
possible impairment of alienability that such a restriction
might impose.77 Seagate, however, specifically addressed
only condominium uses. This case identified condominium
regimes as having a special character that justified distinguishing them from other forms of restricted subdivisions.7"
The court stated that:
Condominium unit owners comprise a little democratic
sub society of necessity more restrictive as it pertains to
use of condominium property than may be existent outside
of condominium units ....

Given the unique problems of

condominium living in general and the special problems
endemic to a tourist oriented community in South Florida
in particular, [the Association's] avowed objective - to inhibit transciency and to impart a certain degree of continuity of residence and a residential character to their
community - is, we believe, a reasonable one, achieved in a
not unreasonable manner by means of the restrictive provision in question.79
72. 531 N.W.2d 917 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
73. Id. at 919-20.
74. Flagler Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Crestview Towers Condominium
Ass'n, 595 So. 2d 198, 200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (leasing restriction).
75. Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condominium Ass'n, 146 Cal. Rptr. 695, 700 (Ct.
App. 1978) (upholding an amendment providing for restrictions against children in residence).
76. 330 So. 2d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
77. Id. at 486.
78. Id.
79. Id. See also Beachwood Villas Condominium v. Poor, 448 So. 2d 1143
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (maintaining that regulation of leasing rights is so
patently within intendment of a condominium development that no specific
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The Seagate court emphasized that the restrictions in
question had a hardship exemption and could be changed by
amendment to the bylaws when necessary." Aside from its
description of the condominium community as a "democratic
sub society," however, the Seagate court did not discuss the
special issues arising when leasing restrictions are imposed
after a unit owner has invested with the expectation of the
right to lease.8
A subsequent Ohio case Worthinglen Condominium
Owners Ass'n v. Brown,8 took a cue from Seagate and
adopted the principle that condominium owners had the
right to some expectation of reasonableness in the manner in
which the association could alter the rules following an
owner's investment:83
We do not.., endorse the view that a person who voluntarily enters the ranks of condominium ownership surrenders all individual property rights. Individual property
receives some protection in the condominium arrangement, although less than that accorded non-condominium
property ....We agree with Seagate and cases from Ohio

and other jurisdictions which generally require that condominium rules meet a "reasonableness test." Accordingly, we adopt the reasonableness test, pursuant to which
the validity of condominium rules is measured by whether
the rule is reasonable under the surrounding circumor capristances. If the rule is unreasonable, arbitrary
4
cious in those circumstances, it is invalid.
The Worthinglen court emphasized that in evaluating
the reasonableness of a condominium rule, it is to consider
whether it has been imposed by a majority in such a way as
to improperly discriminate against a minority.85 Where an
amendment is involved, the court should take into account
the potential hardship imposed upon parties who invested in
reliance upon the existing rules. Worthinglen rejected the
"vested rights" approach protecting pre-existing unit owners
language in declaration is necessary to justify an association board in enacting
such regulations as part of standard "use regulations"). See supra notes 2-8
and accompanying text.
80. Seagate, 330 So. 2d at 486.
81. Id.
82. 566 N.E.2d 1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
83. Id. at 1277.
84. Id. (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 1278.
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espoused in Breene, but remanded the case for a fuller consideration of the justification for the imposition of the leasing
restriction at issue. 8
A subsequent Florida case, Flagler Federal Savings &
Loan Ass'n v. Crestview Towers Condominium Ass'n of Miami," implicitly rejected the reasoning of Seagate and Wor8 Flaglerupheld the imposition of a leasing restricthinglen."
tion against a lender who took a deed in lieu of foreclosure on
a condominium unit following an amendment to the association's bylaws. The amendment removed the existing provision permitting foreclosing lenders an exemption from the
general "no leasing" policy.89 The specific nature of the provision and its amendment brings the court's rejection of the
condominium unit owners' "investment expectations" that
rules will not be changed into sharp focus.9" Flagleris absolute in its view as to the power of an association to change
the rules on renting units, even in the case where there was
clearly significant and specific reliance upon the existing
rule.
One of the most recent cases in this area suggests a
"bifurcated" approach to evaluating association amendments.
Apple II Condominium Ass'n v. Worth Bank & Trust Co.,9
proposed that changes in association policies emanating from
discretionary judgments of boards of directors or other association subgroups vested with discretion be evaluated on the
basis of their overall reasonableness. Factual amendments
to declarations or bylaws carried out by membership vote,
however, would be measured only on the grounds of "strict
rationality." The Illinois appeals court specifically rejected
the reasoning of the Ohio appeals court in Worthinglen;
courts should protect unit owners from "tyranny of the majority" by evaluating voted changes on the grounds of the reasonableness of retroactive application.98 Under the Apple II

86. Id. at 1279.
87. 595 So. 2d 198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 200.
90. Id. See McElveen-Hunter v. Fountain Manor Ass'n, 386 S.E.2d 435
(N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (discussing a similar "categorical" statement of an association's right to change the rules on leasing).
91. 659 N.E.2d 93 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
92. Id. at 98.
93. Id.
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test, when the amendment has been passed by membership
vote in accordance with established association procedures,
the court will presume that the restriction is valid, and uphold it unless it can be shown that the restriction is arbitrary, against public policy, or violates some fundamental
constitutional right of the unit owners."
In summary, the cases involving changes in the rules
concerning leasing constitute a spectrum of four different
groups: (1) recognition of a vested right in the unit owner;
(2) evaluation of any change in terms of the reasonableness of
its application against the expectations of existing owners;
(3) "bifurcation" between changes implemented by representative boards and changes approved by voted amendment to
the bylaws or declaration; and (4) vested right in association
to change the rules at will.
Many of the above cases arise in the condominium context, and stress the special nature of the condominium relationship and special statutes dealing with condominiums. It
would not be difficult, however, to make similar arguments
justifying association power in dealing with the many noncondominium forms of common interest ownership that have
evolved in recent years. These cases simply have not yet
reached the appellate courts. When they do, it is likely that
the courts will apply an identical analysis.
Although the cases involving leasing do not focus specifically on the significance of the leasing power as one that goes
to the heart of an investment decision, they treat the question of amendment in this area as simply one of many
changes associations may implement. Jurisdictions that
charge courts with the duty of evaluating the reasonableness
of a change on a case by case basis, however, have created a
method by which unit owners can argue the special significance of their expectation of a continued right to rent.
C. Pet Restrictions
In a fascinating and important series of decisions, California courts have recently examined the validity of pet restrictions and, by extension, the degree to which courts
should apply their own view of the reasonableness of owners'
association rules when called upon to interpret or enforce
94. Id. at 99.
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those rules. In Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium
Ass'n,9" a California appeals court ruled that a unit owner
who acquired her unit when the declaration contained clear
language prohibiting cats, could nevertheless keep her three
cats.9" The court evaluated the "reasonableness" of the restriction; it concluded that the restriction was unreasonable
where it could not be shown that the cats imposed any burden on the community through noise, odor, or otherwise.97
The California Supreme Court ultimately reversed, ruling that courts ought not to "second guess" the reasonableness of association rule making. The Court stated that
courts should refuse to enforce such rules only when the objector has proven that the rules are arbitrary, substantially
more burdensome than beneficial to the affected properties,
or violative of a fundamental public policy." In reaching this
conclusion, the court also overruled California cases questioning other types of association rules: restrictions on the
use of satellite dishes99 and restrictions on trucks parking in
association parking areas.'00
The reported decision in Nahrstedt, including a strong
dissent by Justice Arabian,' was an important milestone in
jurisprudence in this area. Although the California decision
does nothing more than interpret the meaning of a California
statute requiring that servitudes must be enforced unless
they are "unreasonable,"' the case was followed by community association authorities nationwide. 3 The decision is
likely to render common law jurisprudence to a posture more
hospitable to the enforcement of recorded restrictions affecting common interest communities.
It is also important, however, to note what Nahrstedt did
not do. The case did not rule on the proper standard for rule
making and other decisions by elected boards in associations.
95. 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994).
96. Id. at 1279.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1275.
99. Berrnardo Villas Mgmt. Corp. v. Black, 235 Cal. Rptr. 509 (Ct. App.
1987).
100. Portola Hills Community Ass'n v. James, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Ct. App.
1992).
101. Id. at 1292. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
102. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1354 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
103. See generally Armand Arabian, Condos, Cats, and CC&Rs: Invasion of
the Castle Common, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (1995).
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The restriction on pets in the Nahrstedt case appeared in the
original recorded covenants, conditions and restrictions,
dating from the origin of the development.'
The court
stressed the fact that the pet restriction was part of the
original arrangement, to which all landowners had committed. °5 It was neither a policy adopted by a representative
group, nor a late change in the documents in contravention of
established expectations. Throughout the opinion, the court
referred to "recorded use restrictions" and emphasized that
these restrictions formed a kind of social covenant to which
all residents committed: "[t]o allow one person to escape obligations under a written instrument upsets the expectations
of all the other parties governed by the instrument (here, the
owners of the other 529 units) that the instrument would be
uniformly and predictably enforced."0 6
The Nahrstedt court cited with approval Hidden Harbor
Estates v. Basso, °7 which drew a distinction between rules
adopted by representative boards through delegated authority and rules set forth in the master deed or declaration.' 8 In
Hidden Harbor, a Florida court of appeals indicated that the
rules adopted by association boards ought to be subjected to a
"reasonableness" scrutiny by the courts. The court reasoned
that these rules may or may not carry out the fundamental
expectations of unit owners upon investment.'9 The original
declaration, however, as viewed by the Hidden Harbor court
should not be evaluated under a "reasonableness standard.""0
Rather, the court stated that such use restrictions are
"clothed with a very strong presumption of validity" and
should be upheld even if they exhibit some degree of unreasonableness."'
Nahrstedt, then, did not reach the ultimate issue of
whether parties who acquire interests in a common interest
community that permits pets have a vested interest that the
104. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1278
(Cal. 1994).
105. Id. at 1292.
106. Id. at 1288.
107. 393 So. 2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
108. Id. at 640.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 639-40.
111. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1278
(Cal. 1994) (quoting in part from Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, 393 So. 2d
637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
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community will continue to permit them. The majority of the

small number of cases that have considered the issue have
upheld such a change, although the procedural contexts in
which these cases have arisen leaves some question as to
whether the courts squarely confronted the issue of whether
an owner
had a vested right in being able to retain his or her
2
pet.

In Noble v. Murphy,"3 the association, by a vote of the
unit owners, amended its bylaws to prohibit new pets; however, prior to the vote the association had rules and regulations with equivalent provisions."" The court emphasized
that the affected unit owner had no quarrel with the change,
as it had prior notice that pet restrictions existed."5
In Cornerstone Condominium Ass'n v. O'Brien,116 a North

Carolina court of appeals upheld the validity of a boardadopted rule prohibiting dogs against a unit owner who
owned his unit prior to the adoption of the prohibition but
did not acquire a dog until afterwards." 7 The sole ground on
appeal was the procedural validity of the rule. The issue of
whether the unit owner had any "vested rights" was not considered." 8 Other cases similarly have failed to address the
issue."'
Perhaps the clearest decision on point is Dulaney Towers
Maintenance Corp. v. O'Brey. ° The association board
adopted rules restricting dogs after the defendant unit owners had acquired their unit.1 ' The rules contained an exemption for existing dogs, but the defendants subsequently ac112. Id.
113. 612 N.E.2d 266 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).
114. Id. at 268. Pets owned prior to a unit owner's arrival at the premises
could be retained. Id.
115. Id. at 271.
116. 435 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
117. Id. at 819.
118. Id.
119. Meadow Bridge Condominium Ass'n v. Bosca, 466 N.W.2d 303 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1991) (only question before court was whether restriction, of which
unit owner had prior notice, constituted a rule that could be adopted by board,
or a bylaw that required unit owner approval); (Shawnee Carlton House Condominium Ass'n v. Worrilow, No. 1-86-35, 1989 WL 17285, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.
1989) (unreported opinion) (finding that unit owner not bound to accept arbitration ruling and could challenge validity of pet restriction adopted after he
purchased a unit; the case was remanded for such challenge).
120. 418 A.2d 1233 (Md. 1980).
121. Id. at 1235.
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quired another dog.'22 In an enforcement action against the
unit owners, a Maryland court of appeals upheld the prohibition against a challenge that the board lacked authority to
regulate the use of units themselves, as. opposed to common
area activities.'2 3 The court also evaluated and upheld the
Although the court did
reasonableness of the prohibition.'
not specifically address whether the defendants had a vested
right due to the pre-existing ownership of their unit, the facts
were squarely before the court and almost certainly taken
into account.
A Florida decision, Winston Towers 200 Ass'n, Inv. v.
Saverio,'2 5 found, with little analysis, that an amendment
prohibiting animals was invalid as against a unit owner who
acquired his unit prior to the amendment, even where the
owner acquired the pet after the amendment upholds a trial
court ruling that the bylaw was "void and unenforceable inasmuch as it was an attempt to impose a retroactive regulation."'26 The association had previously permitted residents
to own dogs registered with the association prior to 1973, the
association adopted its new restriction in 1974.127 In a sense,
it was ex post facto legislation for pets acquired between the
1973 cut-off date and the 1974 rule.'28 The complainant's pet
did not fall within that class, so it is difficult to know exactly
what the court considered as the fatal flaw in the restric"'
The case was otherwise devoid of reasoning and aption. 29
peared to depart substantially from other Florida case law of
the same period 3 ° upholding use regulations of various kinds

122. Id.
123. Id. at 1237. Defendants argued that regulation concerning the use of
privately owned units was appropriate only for unit owner voted changes in
bylaws or declaration. The court acknowledged that authority construing Massachusetts statutes analogous to the prior Maryland law might have supported
such a conclusion, but that the revised Maryland statutes clearly authorized
delegation to the association board of the power to regulate the use of units as
well as common areas. Id. at 1237-38.
124. Id. at 1235.
125. 360 So. 2d 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
126. Id. at 470-71.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Seagate Condominium Ass'n v. Duffy, 330 So. 2d 484 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (leasing restriction); Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, 393
So. 2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (prohibition on use of well).
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including, ironically, prohibitions on children."'
The pet prohibition cases involve the quintessential area
of use regulation that should be considered within the discretion of the association,"' at least as to acquisition of pets following implementation of a prohibition. Community living
necessarily involves certain compromise. Where the community interest is against the keeping of pets, there is arguably
no critical interest affected by adopting a prohibition against
acquisition of pets. Judge Arabian, however, felt differently. 3' Courts evaluating the issue have treated it as a serious matter; but even more serious matters would appear to
be the more profound questions of whether children may live
in a unit, or the economically more serious issue of whether a
unit can be rented.
The few cases considering the pet issue, appear to treat
differently the question of whether the amendment ought to
apply to unit owners who already have pets. This may raise
a more fundamental question as to whether amendments
ought to be scrutinized for their uniform application, as discussed below.
D. Building Restrictions
Among the most common restrictions binding residential
subdivisions are those prohibiting construction building on
affected lots. For example, some associations allow single
family homes only. Such provisions have appeared in subdivision declarations. Judicial decisions for over sixty years,
predating the explosion of common interest ownership developments, also reflect these restrictions. The principles by
which courts evaluate changes in such provisions, however,
are relevant to an analysis of the rights of common interest
development unit owners. Indeed, in common interest communities where the units consist of undeveloped lots, these

131. Everglades Plaza Condominium Ass'n v. Buckner, 462 So. 2d 835 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984). The case, similar to Winston Towers, involves a unit
owner who had no children at the time of the amendment, but who later acquired a stepchild whom he wanted to reside in his unit. Id.
132. See supra Part II.D. There is no need to elevate the question of ownership rights. It is no more than a use regulation to be handled at the level of
board discretion. See also Meadow Bridge Condominium Ass'n v. Bosca, 466
N.W.2d 303 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
133. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1292
(Cal. 1994) (Arabian, J., dissenting).
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same restrictions are likely to appear. Further, many common interest communities have architectural control provisions limiting changes to the exterior characteristics of individual units.
A number of cases address the question of whether there
are limits on the ability of unit owners, pursuant to express
modification provisions in their declarations, to alter building
restrictions within their developments."' As a general matter, where the provisions are clear, the courts have little
problem upholding such modifications.13 A number of decisions, however, have inserted an important judicial limitation on the functioning of these provisions: unit owners cannot alter restrictions affecting a single lot or a small number
of lots."' The rationale is that the original declaration envisioned a scheme that provided for mutual burdens and benefits established by the building restrictions.3 7 Courts will
permit a uniform alteration of the restrictions, so that all lots
are affected equally by the newly revised burdens and benefits. It would be inconsistent with the scheme to permit only
some lots to suffer greater burdens or benefit from lesser
burdens without a reciprocal impact on the balance of lot
Such an alteration would be inconsistent with the
owners.'
original purpose of the scheme and is viewed as beyond the
power of amendment, even where the provisions granting
such powers are not so limited. 9
An example of this line of cases is Riley v. Boyle,140 where
134. Zent v. Morrow, 476 S.W.2d. 872 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
135. See infra note 147.
136. The seminal case on the point appears to be Cowherd Dev. Co. v. Littick, 238 S.W.2d 346 (Mo. 1951). See also Walton v. Jaskiewics, 563 A.2d 382
(Md. 1989); Camelback Del Este Homeowners Ass'n v. Warner, 749 P.2d 930
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (relieving nine of 83 lots from single-family restriction);
Zent. v. Morrow, 476 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (holding that any action
taken by property owners to "alter, extend, or revoke" existing restrictions,
must apply to all of the properties subject to them); Montoya v. Barrerras, 473
P.2d 363 (N.M. 1970) (relieving one lot from single-family restriction); B.C.
Rickets, Validity, Construction,and Effect of ContractualProvision Regarding
Future Revocation or Modification of Covenant Restricting Use of Real Property, 4 ALR 3D 570, 582 (1986).
137. See supra note 136.
138. See supra note 136.
139. But see Fairway Estates v. McNamee, CIV. No. 88 CA 27, 1988 WL
134864, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (unpublished opinion) (rejecting uniformity
requirement in Ohio). Where subdivision restrictions permit amendment by
stipulated vote, amendment can affect only one lot. Id.
140. 434 P.2d 525 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967).
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the declaration provided that existing restrictions on development of subdivision lots could be amended by a vote of 51%
of the lot owners. 41 The court held that this language necessarily meant that this percentage of lot owners could amend
the restrictions as to all the lots, but not merely as to some of
the lots.14 To permit otherwise
would destroy the basic
4
scheme of uniform restrictions:

1

Taking these words to mean that particular lots could be
excepted permits the obviously unintended result that 51
per cent of the owners could exempt their own property
and leave the other 49 per cent unencumbered or could
even impose more strict restrictions upon certain lots.
Certainly such an interpretation could easily result in a
patchwork quilt of different restrictions according to the
views of various groups of 51 per cent1 44and completely upset the orderly plan of the subdivision.

In some cases, changes agreed to by all lot owners led to
changed circumstances within the subdivision and it no
45
longer made sense to attempt to enforce the restrictions.
Even in these circumstances, however, courts have been reluctant to authorize further change if it is possible that the
original scheme can be preserved.146

Where the original

scheme did not call for uniform restrictions,
partial altera7
tions in the scheme have been permitted.

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Cf. Lakeshore Estates Recreational Area, Inc. v. Turner, 481 S.W.2d
572 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972). "The release of that right which they have acquired in
the other lots, termed in the old cases, their status as 'dominant tenants' as to
the other lots, may not be altered without their consent or its alteration in such
a way as to be uniform as to all of the affected property." Id. at 575.
144. Riley v. Boyle, 434 P.2d 525, 528 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967).
145. See, e.g., La Esperanza Townhome Ass'n v. Title Sec. Agency of Arizona,
689 P.2d 178 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
146. See, eg., Camelback Del Este Homeowners Ass'n v. Warner, 749 P.2d
930 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Zent v. Murrow, 476 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App.
1972).
147. See Vogli & Co. v. Lane, 405 S.W.2d 885 (Mo. 1966). The Missouri Supreme court upheld the removal of significant building restrictions on six lots,
all owned by one interest. The subdivision restrictions provided that homeowners, by seventy-five percent vote, could "release any one or more" of the restrictions. Id. at 890. The court ruled that this language ought not to be limited only to apply to only releases as to all lots. Id. Note that the respondent
objecting homeowners in this case filed no brief, but the court did cite and distinguish Cowherd Development Co. v. Littick, 238 S.W.2d 346 (Mo. 1951), on the
grounds that in the instant case the restrictions were already non uniform, and
that the six lots were specially burdened, suggesting that special provisions
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It appears, however, that the real thrust of these opinions is to interpret the express protections provided by the
declarations, not to specify any fundamental interest as sacrosanct even from express declaration language permitting
change."" Other cases have permitted piecemeal change
Only one case was
where the declaration was express.'
found, however, that gave a "liberal" reading of an amending
provision. The court then read the provision to permit alterations as to only some lots when the provision could have
been read more narrowly. For the most part, the trend appears to integrate these provisions narrowly in order to protect individual expectations of a uniform scheme from alterations effectuated by less than a unanimous group of
homeowners.
It must be noted, however, that the expectation protected
in this line of cases is not that the development within the
subdivision will remain the way it was when a property
owner first invested. The courts are quite willing to authorize massive changes if such change is authorized in the declaration, even if approved by only a bare majority. Thus, the
development could change dramatically. The only protection
provided by the courts is that the change be uniform. The focus of this protection appears to be directed more at relieving
a lot owner from burdens when there is no correlative benefit, rather than protecting a homeowner: expectation of continued enforcement of existing restrictions.
III. CHANGES IN USE OF COMMON ELEMENTS

Condominium regimes create co-tenancy interests in all
unit owners in "common elements,"5 ° portions of the development property not owned separately by individual own-

could be made as to them. Vogli, 405 S.W.2d at 890.
148. See supra note 147.
149. See supra note 139.
150. The term "common elements," will be used rather than "common elements," as this is the term most frequently used in condominium statutes and
documents. Some of the commonly owned items involve physical structures,
fixtures, or other tangible or intangible interests. It is perhaps most appropriate to use a term that does not suggest that the commonly owned property is
nothing more than space or ground. The bulk of the commonly owned property
in question, however, consists of property that would ordinarily be known as
"real estate:" land, appurtenances to land (such as easements), improvements,
and fixtures.
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ers.11 Commonly, the declaration by which the condominium
regime is established vests the owners' association with certain powers related to these common elements." 2
The inquiry is whether individual unit owners have the
right to argue that their expectations, based upon conditions
existing when they acquired ownership are protected from
subsequent action by governing boards. One could envision a
system in which all control over the common elements is
vested in the association board as trustee for the co-tenant
owners. This is more or less what happens in other forms of
common interest ownership environments. For example, in
residential subdivisions, the association board is given broad
management control over amenities such as recreational facilities, clubhouses, and even private streets and ways.
The common elements in a condominium development,
however, often bear a more fundamental relationship to a
unit owner's property expectation. The elements may, in
fact, include all of the physical superstructure that envelop
the unit owner's property: the walls, floors, roof, elevators,
lobbies, parking areas and the ground beneath the structure.
The unit owner in a multi-level condominium structure usually separately owns only an area of space defined by the internal dimensions measured inward from the building
studs."'3 Consequently, the unit owner has a strong interest
in the integrity of certain of the common elements. This interest is reflected in both case and statutory law
Most of the court decisions in this area involve detailed
interpretations of condominium statutes and provisions of
declarations. Arguably, the courts are doing nothing more
151. In most cases, this feature differentiates condominiums from other
forms of common interest ownership. In planned unit communities and similar
subdivisions, for example, property that is not owned by individual unit owners
will likely be owned by a separate entity-an incorporated or unincorporated
association, which in turn has members that usually consist of the individual
property owners in the development. Where the association owns the elements
intended for common use and benefit, the association, through its organic charter and bylaws, can make decisions concerning the use of these elements. This
section addresses the special problems that arise in condominium settings
where the common elements actually are owned in common by individual condominium unit owners but managed by an association.
152. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-105 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
522 (1997); UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (1968), 7 pt. 2 U.L.A 489 (1997).
153. WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUMS & HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION
PRACTICE: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW § 7.06(a)1, at 380-81 (2d ed. 1988)
[hereinafter HYATT, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW].
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than interpreting clear language expressing legislative or
contractual intent. When comparing the decisions involving
common elements to other cases in which courts review the
power of associations to alter pre-existing conditions, however, one finds a decided trend toward providing greater protection of unit purchasers' expectations. This is especially
true with regard to common elements, both as to rights of use
and protection from change.'
A. Association Approval of PhysicalIntrusions into Common
Elements by Unit Owners
Generally, condominium regimes create two types of
common elements: general common elements (or, simply,
Limited
common elements) and limited common elements.'
common elements are owned in common, but use of these
elements is provided to an individual unit owner.'56 Limited
common elements include: balconies, patios, parking areas,
window frames and other parts of the individual unit that
protrude beyond the boundaries of the unit. 57 The purpose of
allocating the ownership to the community is to insure that
the community has the right and responsibility to maintain
these elements for the good of the community, even though a
single unit owner retains day-to-day use. General common
elements include: most of the structure housing the units,
the land, general use parking areas, and recreational facilities."'
Most condominium statutes provide that both types of
common elements are owned in common by the unit owners,
in proportions established by statute or by the declaration.
The ownership or the percentages of ownership cannot be
changed without some meaningful form of consent; frequently 100%-of all unit owners.'59 The statutes also fre154. This discussion does not include cases involving attempts by declarants,
original condominium developer, to add to, or obtain special use of, the common
elements after commencing the development of the condominium. The balance
between the interests of developer and unit owners involves special political
and consumer law issues that are not relevant to the inquiry in this article.
155. HYATT, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW, supra note 153, § 7.06(a)(2)-(4),
at 381-83.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See generally Grey v. Coastal States Holding Co., 578 A.2d 1080 (Conn.
App. 1990) (protecting unit owners' rights in common elements from invasion
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quently contain contradictory language, vesting in the vote of
the board of directors or some other process, control over the
management of the common areas, including language that
permits their sale or disposition.16
A few cases have relied upon the breadth of the management rights of the board of directors to provide general
authority to restrict the ownership of common elements. In
Ochs v. L'Enfant Trust,"' for example, the D.C. Court of Appeals found that a condominium board of directors had
authority to transfer a "conservation easement" to a private
historical preservation group. The court allowed the transfer
even though the easement would permanently affect the
value of the building and the individual units in it in addition
to potentially requiring significant maintenance costs for the
association in the future. 6 2 The court relied upon language
in the D.C. condominium laws that permitted the board of directors to "grant easements through the common elements."
The court concluded that other language in the statute and
declaration that protected the interests of the unit owners in
the common elements was necessarily subordinate to, or consistent with, this language.'
The Ochs case contains several technical flaws. Any real
property specialist would note the obvious flaw in the court's
interpretation of the "conservation easement" involved in this
case, not as an easement, but rather an elaborate set of covenants limiting the rights of the owners, instead of extending
use rights to third parties. The statutory language authorizing the granting of easements "through" the common eleby other unit owners-addition of second story to units consisting of free
standing buildings); Brickell Bay Club Condominium Ass'n v. Hernstadt, 512
So. 2d 994 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (protecting unit owners' rights in common
elements from invasion by other unit owners-incorporation of existing structure on roof of condominium building into unit owner's residential complex).
160. Wayne S. Hyatt, Creating Community & Government: A New Perspective, in DRAFrING DOCUMENTS FOR CONDOMINIUMS, PUDs & GOLF COURSE
COMMUNITIES, C924 ALI-ABA 413 (May 5, 1994).
161. 504 A.2d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
162. Id. at 1117.
163. Id. The court did not quote any of the language, but the general references suggested language similar to that commonly appearing in other statutes
and construed in other cases in this section of the article. For a similar case,
dealing with more traditional easement rights, see Shaumburg State Bank. v.
Bank of Wheaton, 555 N.E.2d 48 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (authorizing the creation of
a non exclusive easement in a third party across common element property on
the express condition that the value or use of the common elements for the individual unit owners would not be diminished).
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ments appears to refer to use rights that involve physically
traversing the space occupied by the common elements,
The
rather than an elaborate contractual undertaking.'
court's willingness to use this general and inapplicable language to preempt the interests of the unit owners in the
common elements, stands in stark contrast to approaches
taken by other courts. 85 This holding appears to represent a
very clear "tilt" toward representative government as the
primary determinant of condominium ownership interests in
the District of Columbia. 6 "
Carney v. Donley'67 is an example of the more prevalent
view recognizing special value in the unit owners' interests in
common elements. 8' A unit owner proposed to extend the
balconies outside his units into space above a sundeck used
by other unit owners."' The space into which the balconies
would protrude constituted common elements. 7 ° Further,
the balconies required physical supports that would be located on the sundecks themselves, also common elements. 7'
The condominium board of directors approved the project
pursuant to a provision which stated that "no alterations of
any common elements or any additions or improvements
thereto shall be made by any unit owner without the prior
Another provision of the
written approval of the Board."'
declaration stated expressly that if a unit owner wished to
"use or occupy any portion of the common elements for any
reasonable use appurtenant to said unit,"'73 it could do so if
there was no unreasonable interference with the common
elements, and another section stated that the Board was the
final arbiter of "any dispute or disagreement between any
unit owners relating the property, or any question of interpretation or application of the provisions of the Declaration
or by-laws. " ""
Despite this rather extensive statement of board discre164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Ochs v. L'Enfant Trust, 504 A.2d 1110, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Id.
See text accompanying note 14.
App. Ct. 1994).
633 N.E.2d 1015 (Ill.
Id.
Id. at 1017.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1019.
App. Ct. 1994).
Carney v. Donley, 633 N.E.2d 1015, 1019 (Ill.
Id. at 1019.
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tion, the court emphasized the protected interest of the unit
owners in the integrity of the common elements. It relied on
language in the declaration that stated "[t]he extent or
amount of [ownership of common elements] shall be expressed by a percentage amount and, once determined, shall
remain constant, and may not be changed without unanimous approval of all owners."'75 Despite the broad management rights expressly given to the board, and notwithstanding the somewhat uncertain application of the declaration
language involving ownership of common elements to a situation involving mere usage of common element space, the
court held that the declaration protected the unit owners
from the board's authorization of the balcony extension.'76
The Carney reading of the declaration language was as
much of a "stretch" of the plain meaning of that document as
was the District of Columbia court of appeal's reading of the
"easement" authorization in L'Enfant Trust. While both
courts were reaching for a policy goal, each was reaching for
a very different one. The District of Columbia decision was
designed to vest control over the condominium in the elected
governors.' 77 The Illinois decision stated that individual unit
owners have special protection in the physical space constituting the common elements.'78
In Posey v. Leavitt,'79 the court similarly protected the integrity of unit owners' expectations in the common elements
against discretionary actions by the association board. 8 ° As
in Carney, the declaration in Posey provided that no owner
could intrude into the common element area without first obtaining written consent of the board. 8 ' The court found that
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1022. Compare Newport Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Concord
Wisconsin, Inc., 556 N.W.2d 775 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding reallocation of
common element verandah to limited common element status when done by
three-fourths vote of association members, most of whom benefited from the
decision, could pointed out that dissenting owner still had statutory protection
if the change diminished the value of his individual unit).
177. Ochs. v. L'Enfant Trust, 504 A.2d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
178. Carney, 633 N.E.2d 1015 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). See also Tully's v. Brookside Condominium Ass'n, 1985 WL 8275 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (unreported
opinion) (holding Board of Director's decision authorizing location of street
lamp in common area was violation of Ohio statue providing that percentage
interest in common elements shall not be diminished).
179. 230 Cal. Rptr. 2d 568 (Ct. App. 1991).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 574.
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the board of a condominium association had approved the extension of a dock into common element area.'82 Nevertheless,
the court concluded that the general language of the declaration provided that the percentage ownership of the common
elements could not be altered; the court sought protected the
unit owners against diminution of their rights in the common
These rights included rights of access and use
elements.'
the dock would compromise.18 Such alteraextending
that
tion could not occur without unanimous owner approval.
B. Allocation of Common Element ParkingRights to
Individual Unit Owners
The special concern that courts give to the integrity of
common element interests generally also appear in a number
of cases involving allocation of parking rights on common
element property. It is well established, and not surprising,
that association boards have general authority to regulate
parking.' 5 Such regulation, so long as it does not alter the
relative rights of the various unit owners, does not interfere
with, the basic property rights of the owners, even though it
may in fact, frustrate their investment expectations.'8 6 Presumably, the validity of such decisions would be measured in
the same way as other use restrictions, such as those involving leasing of units'87 and keeping of pets.'88
Numerous cases, however, have concluded that an attempt by the association to reallocate parking rights in common element parking areas, allowing some unit owners different rights than others, constitutes an alteration in the
182. Id. at 578. Under California's somewhat unusual condominium statutes, it was permissible for the association actually to own the common areas,
subject to easements in the owners, as was the case here. The mutual easements of use owned by the unit owners collectively constituted common elements that formed the basis of the unit owner's rights.
183. Id. at 578.
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., Board. of Directors of by the Sea Council of Co-Owners, Inc. v.
Sondock, 644 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App. 1982) (discussing that an association,
through declaration amendment approved by 2/3 vote, could decide to remove
existing carports rather than repair them); Gillman v. Pebble Cove Home Owners Ass'n, Inc., 546 N.Y.S.2d 134 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (holding that a Board
could adopt rule prohibit residents from parking in streets owned by association).
186. Posey v. Leavitt, 230 Cal. Rptr. 2d 568 (Ct. App. 1991).
187. See supra Part I.B.
188. See supra Part II.C.
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relative ownership rights of common elements. 189 Such a
change must satisfy the rigorous approval requirements set
forth in the statute of declaration for ownership changes.
The only departure from this rule is found in Lyman v.
Boonin,90 which involved an historical Philadelphia building
that had been converted into a condominium. It had limited
parking capacity.'
The condominium association voted to
change the parking policies to allocate available parking on a
priority basis allowing resident unit owners priority over
non-resident owners.'9 2 Plaintiff non-resident owners attempted to overturn the decision, arguing that it constituted
a reallocation of percentage ownership in common elements
without appropriate approval. 93 The association defended on
the grounds that the association board had clear authority to
regulate parking under the declaration and could legally allocate parking priority to resident owners.' The court upheld
the association's priority system, but carefully distinguished
contrary authority on the grounds that the limited parking
facilities involved in this case made it impossible to provide
equal access to all unit owners.'
The court acknowledged
"equal interest in common elements" principle, however, by
requiring that the association charge those with parking
privileges a fee equivalent to the true cost of maintaining the
parking facilities. Thus, unit owners without parking access
would not have to subsidize "parkers" through maintenance
assessments paid to the common fund.9 6
Alpert v.Le'Lisa Condominium Ass'n'97 also upheld a reallocation of parking rights to the most tenured residents
from units that had previously had parking rights allocated
189. See, e.g. Kaplan v. Boudreaux, 573 N.E.2d 495 (Mass. 1991); Thanasoulis v. Winston Towers, 542 A.2d 900 (N.J. 1988); Sawko v. Dominion Plaza
One Condominium Ass'n No. 1-A, 578 N.E.2d 621 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Stuewe v.
Lauletta, 418 N.E.2d 138 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Makeever v. Lyte, 609 P.2d 1084
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).
190. 580 A.2d 765 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
191. Id. at 767.
192. Id. The rules revision also prohibited the subletting of parking spaces,
attempting to insure that the priority parking system really served its purpose
of accommodating resident owners ahead of others with respect to the limited
space available in the structure. Id.
193. Id. at 767.
194. Id.
195. Lyman v. Boonin, 580 A.2d 765, 769 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
196. Id.
197. 667 A.2d 947 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
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to them.'9 8 There were adequate spaces for all units in this
case, but only some of the spaces were indoors.'99 Plaintiff,
who had acquired a unit with an allocated parking space
prior to the declaration amendment, objected on the ground
that the amendment altered common element rights and
therefore required unanimous approval."°° Absent such approval, plaintiff argued, there could be no reallocation, even
though the amendment had been approved by 93.7% of the
owners.2"' The court analogized parking allocation to use restrictions such as those discussed earlier.0 2 The court concluded that where only temporary parking rights were allocated to unit owners, did not transfer upon resale, and thus
there was no interference with the ownership of common
elements.0 3 The Le'Lisa decision, however, has recently been
overruled0 4 in a case involving access rights.
C. Access and Road Usage Rights
Common elements generally are the means by which
owners obtain access to their units. Although, some control
over the usage of these ways is necessary to maintain order,
and the association boards are the appropriate governors of
these ways, courts have recognized, a fundamental right of
access that association boards do not have authority to abrogate. The right of access is such a fundamental concern of a
property owner that the common law has long recognized
special rules providing for access upon the subdivision of real
estate. Lot owners may obtain implied easements of necessity even when there is no existing road. When there is an
existing road, lot owners may obtain easements of implication across those roads. When roads are laid on subdivision
plats, most courts recognize some right to use these roads, al198. Id.
199. Id. at 949.
200. Id. at 951.
201. Id. at 950.
202. See supra Parts I, II.
203. Alpert v. Le'Lisa Condominium Ass'n, 667 A.2d 947, 955-56 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1995).
204. Sea Watch Stores L.L.C. v. Council of Unit Owners of Sea Watch Condominium, 691 A.2d 750 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997). The court overruled Le'Lisa
on the basis of Ridgely Condominium Ass'n v. Smyrniodis, 681 A.2d 494 (Md.
1996), which held that allocation of exclusive use rights in common element
property to an individual unit owner, is an invalid diminution in the rights of
other unit owners. Id.
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though there is some disagreement as to whether this right
inheres to all the roads or only to those reasonably necessary
for access to the owner's parcel.2 °5
The traditional emphasis on the importance of access is
likely to find its way into the jurisprudence of common ownership associations. Access to condominiums, usually requires access across common elements. The alteration of access rights generally is regarded as an alteration of common
element ownership usually requiring special, if not, unanimous, ownership approval.
A decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Court, Kaplan
v. Boudreaux, °6 illustrates the extensive protections afforded
to common element ownership.0 7 A walkway within a complex provided access to only a single unit.2 8 The owners of
that unit sought permission to landscape the area as well as
an amendment providing that they had exclusive use of the
area."' Although over seventy percent of the owners consented to the change (more than enough for most purposes of
amendment), one unit owner challenged the action as a contravention of a provision of the declaration which stated that
there could be no change in the percentage of common element ownership without unanimous consent. 10 The court
held that allowing the proposed change would breach that
provision of the declaration, even though the rights conferred
by the change would merely constitute an exclusive license,
not an ownership right, the area was of no practical benefit
to anyone but those who sought the special rights.21'
Another recent and important case in this area is the
Maryland Court of Appeals decision in Ridgely Condominium
Ass'n v. Smyrniodis,"2 where an association of mixed com-

205. 10 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 22, § 34.08[2].
206. 573 N.E.2d 495 (Mass. 1991).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 496.
209. Id. at 497.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 500. Cf. Grimes v. Moreland, 322 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio Misc. 1974)
(holding that the placement of air conditioner compressors for individual units
in common areas constitutes an impermissible ouster of other tenants from
that area). Compare Parillo v. 1300 Lake Shore Drive Condominium, 431
N.E.2d 1221 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (permitting owner to enclose balcony that was a
limited common element would not change percentage of ownership rights because use already was exclusive).
212. 681 A.2d 494 (Md. 1996).
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mercial/residential condominium adopted a rule restricting
access through its lobby for commercial unit owners. ' The
owners had ready street access through outside entrances,
but objected that the loss of access through the newly refurbished lobby would diminish the value of their businesses.214
Lower courts reviewed the association decision on the
'
grounds of its reasonableness, and had found it invalid. 15
When the association appealed to Maryland's highest court,
however, the court set aside the issues as briefed and analyzed the case in terms of the diminution of the ownership interest of the commercial tenants." 6 The declaration had
given them an undivided interest in the common elements,
including the lobby. The court, citing Kaplan, among other
cases, concluded that a restriction of their use of the lobby
diluted their ownership interest in the common elements.
Such diminution of ownership could not be accomplished
without unanimous consent of unit owners." '
IV. GENERAL CONTROLS ON COMMON INTEREST RULES
In evaluating whether courts ought to take into account
expectation interests of existing unit owners when addressing changed policies it is useful to inquire whether there are
any general judicial restrictions on the operation of community policies," 8 resulting from amendment or originally ap213. Id.
214. Id. at 497.
215. Id. at 498.
216. Id. at 499.
217. Id. at 500. The court distinguished a Maine decision that had approved
an expansion of access to certain recreational common elements by an adjacent
resort hotel. In this case, there was no restriction on the rights of the existing
owners, nor alteration of their relative rights, but simply the granting of a nonexclusive use right to others. See Jarvis v. Stage Neck Owners Ass'n, 464 A.2d
952 (Me. 1983). Cf Schaumburg State Bank v. Bank of Wheaton, 555 N.E.2d
App. Ct. 1990) (grant of non exclusive easement rights in common ele48 (Ill.
ment access area not a dilution of ownership).
218. The balance of this article discusses considerations that usually apply
both to subdivisions that have no formal associations and to associationgoverned communities. The author refers to all types of common interest developments as "communities." Further, the basic documentation of the interests of the owners might be set forth in the declaration, articles and bylaws of
an association, statement of covenants, conditions and restrictions, cross easement agreement, subdivision plat, or some similar basic document, or some
combination of documents. For purposes of this article, all the original documents containing the original community arrangement will be referred to as
the "community charter."
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pearing in the community charter. A number of limitations
on the discretion of communities to enforce their policies
have been adopted by courts or proposed in the literature.
This article considers several of them: the "reasonableness"
test; the "business judgment" rule, and Constitutional standards."'
A. Reasonableness Test
A number of jurisdictions have found it useful to adopt a
"reasonableness" standard; that common interest regulations
should be enforced only when such enforcement would be
"reasonable." This standard appears in the statutes of a few
states.2 0 In some states, the statutes require that the provisions of a condominium declaration contain "reasonable" restrictions.2 21 At least one commentator has argued that such
language might not limit the reach of rules as opposed to
declaration terms.222 Florida statutes impose reasonableness
limitations only on rules pertaining to the use of the common
2
elements, common areas, and recreational facilities."
Many other jurisdictions have adopted a common law requirement that community policies be "reasonable."22 4 One of
the most commonly cited cases is Hidden HarbourEstates v.
Norman,225 which upheld a condominium association rule
limiting the use of alcoholic beverages in the clubhouse. 26'
The court indicated that "an association is not at liberty to
adopt arbitrary or capricious rules bearing no relationship to

219. For an overview of the two most widely applied tests: the business
judgment test and the reasonableness test, see Carl B. Kress, Beyond
Nahrstedt:Reviewing Restrictions Governing Life in a Property Owner Association, 42 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1995).
220. See ALA. CODE § 35-9-9(3) (1991) (condominium rules generally); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1354 (covenants on land generally); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8B-13(d)
(West 1989 & Supp. 1997).
221. MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-9-17 (1972 & Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3436-10 (1995); UTAH CODE ANN § 57-8-10(1) (Michie 1994).
222. See L. Schiller, Limitations on the Enforceability of Condominium
Rules, 22 STETSON L. REV. 1133, 1139 (1993).
223. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.123(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998).
224. See O'Buck v. Cottonwood Village Condominium Ass'n, 750 P.2d 813,
817 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); Worthinglen Condominium Owners' Ass'n v.
Brown, 566 N.E.2d 1273 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v.
Norman, 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Ryan v. Baptiste, 565 S.W.2d
196 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
225. 309 So. 2d 180.
226. Id. at 182.
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the health, happiness and enjoyment of life of the various
unit owners." 7 The court stated specifically that the test
was one of "reasonableness," and that the rights of the association go beyond merely recapitulating the common law protection against nuisance. 8 The justification for the broad
reach of condominium rules, notwithstanding their negative
impact on personal freedom and alienability of property, was
that condominium residents are more interdependent than
other property owners. As such, they need to be able to agree
upon elaborate mutually binding rules:.2 9
[I]nherent in the condominium concept is the principle
that to promote the health, happiness, and peace of mind
of the majority of the unit owners since they are living in
such close proximity and using facilities in common, each
unit owner must give up a certain degree of freedom of
choice which he might otherwise enjoy in separate, privately owned property. Condominium unit owners comprise a little democratic sub society of necessity more restrictive as it pertains to use of condominium property
than may be existent outside the condominium organization.23°
Courts generally treat the "reasonableness" test as an issue
of law. Cases applying the test go to some length in
evaluating the justifications for the particular rule. 31
In Hidden Harbor Estates v. Basso,"'2 a Florida court
subsequently held that the "reasonableness standard" was
appropriate for determinations made by elected boards, but
that was not an appropriate measure of unit-owner voted
changes to the declaration or bylaws. 33 In the case of voted
changes, the Hidden Harbor court concluded that courts
ought to sustain such changes unless the changed violated
public2 34 policy or abrogated a fundamental constitutional
right.
A recent Florida decision, Holiday Pines Property Own227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 181.
230. Id. at 181-82.
231. See, eg., Dulaney Towers Maintenance Corp. v. O'Brey, 418 A.2d 1233
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980) (pet restriction).
232. 393 So. 2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (application of building restriction to well).
233. Id. at 640.
234. Id.
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ers Ass'n v. Wetherington,235 however, identified a separate

limitation on the rights of unit owners to amend a subdivision plat.16 Holiday Pines, involved some property owners

who opposed several amendments to restrictions originally
set forth on a subdivision plat (the functional equivalent of a
condominium declaration)." 7 The changes in question were
proposed by the developer with regard to a number of separate subdivision areas.288 The recorded restrictions in some of
these areas expressly permitted the developer to amend the
restrictions over time." 9 Those in other areas, however, required a two-thirds approval of lot owners.24 ° The restrictions
that gave the court difficulty created one master association
relating to all plats, made membership in the association
mandatory, and conferred upon the association extensive
budgeting and assessment rights.24' Finally, the right to
amend the provisions relating to the association was permitted only by a majority of affected homeowners.242 The Holiday Pines court held that the consolidation of the subdivisions was valid since the original restrictive covenants had
permitted the addition of new subdivisions.243 The court also
upheld a set of amendments in 1983 that created a voluntary
owner's association and an architectural review committee.244
The court struck down, however, the provisions of a 1987
amendment that made membership in the homes association
mandatory.24'
Interestingly, in striking down the 1987
changes as beyond reasonable contemplation of the original
covenants, the court stated that the problem was that they
effectively made the subdivision into a condominium. It indicated that non-condominium subdivisions did not involved
the special interconnectedness of ownership that justified
235. 596 So. 2d 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
236. Id. at 87.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 86.
239. Id. at 85.
240. Id. at 86. The court does not differentiate between the validity of the
owner-voted changes and the developer-enacted changes. It apparently would
apply the reasonableness test to both. 596 So. 2d 84, 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
241. Holiday Pines Property Owners Ass'n v. Wetherington, 596 So. 2d 84,
87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
242. Id. at 87.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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surrender of individual freedom in condominium settings .46
In language that clearly subjects all forms of subdivision
plat amendments to a rule of reason, the court stated:
In determining the enforceability of an amendment to restrictive covenants, the test is one or reasonableness.
While traditionally a reservation of the right to amend restrictions would allow the grantor to change the entire
character of a subdivision, the modern view is that a reserved power to modify restrictions must be exercised in a
reasonable manner so as not to destroy the general plan of
development. 247
Prior Florida authority on this point had applied this
reasonableness limitation to amendments to subdivision
properties in dicta. 48 The cases themselves involved changes
carried out by the developer, rather than by vote of unit owners.249 The new language goes further and states that even
amendments voted on by other unit owners cannot alter the
basic expectations created in the original scheme.2 5 This is
not to say that a court should feel comfortable rejecting a
community charter amendment barring pets or prohibiting
leasing. Such actions may be consistent with the original
scheme, even if the root documents are broadly phrased. The
use of the word "reasonable," however, necessarily suggests
an individual judgment based upon the individual circumstances of the community. No universal conclusions can be
reached as to a particular change.
The Texas court of appeals decision in Couch v. Southern
Methodist University... refused to uphold an amendment to a
subdivision plat that removed building restrictions, including
"residential only" limitations, on a group of properties. 52 The

246. Id.
247. Holiday Pines Property Owners Ass'n v. Wetherington, 596 So. 2d 84,
87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
248. Nelle v. Loch Haven Homeowners Ass'n, 413 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1982); Flamingo Ranch Estates, Inc. v. Sunshine Ranches Homeowner's, Inc., 303 So. 2d
665 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1974); Johnson v. Three Bays Properties #2, Inc., 159 So.
2d 924 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
249. See Nelle v. Loch Haven Homeowners Ass'n, 413 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1982);
Flamingo Ranch Estates, Inc. v. Sunshine Ranches Homeowner's, Inc., 303 So.
2d 665 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1974); Johnson v. Three Bays Properties #2, Inc., 159
So. 2d 924 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
250. Id.
251. 10 S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928).
252. Id. at 974.
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properties apparently were held by various owners.253 The
amendment had been approved by a vote of more than three
quarters of the owners within the subdivision, as permitted
by amendment provisions in the restrictions themselves. "
Nevertheless, the court held that the changes in question destroyed the character of the subdivision and could not be implemented without unanimous consent. 55 The court did not
use "reasonableness" as a limitation on association rights.256
The decision in Worthinglen Condominium Owners' Ass'n
v. Brown"7 contains the most extensive discussion on the application of the reasonableness test to amendments to common interest ownership relationships. The court stated that,
under Ohio law, the reasonableness test involved several discrete inquiries: (1) whether the decision or rule was arbitrary
or capricious; (2) whether the decision or rule was discriminatory or even-handed; and (3) whether the decision or rule
was made in good faith. 8 These standards applied whether
or not the issue was the impact of a rule on vested rights or
expectations.25 The Worthinglen court added a fourth consideration when the change had an impact on pre-existing
expectations 60 that the retroactive impact of a rule must be
considered in evaluating its reasonableness:261
We agree that evaluation of any condominium rule under
the reasonableness test requires an examination of the
foregoing considerations, including the potential hardship
253. Id. at 973.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 974. Cf. Twin Lakes Village Property Ass'n v. Twin Lakes Investment. 857 P.2d 611 (Idaho 1993) (refusing to uphold amendments to a subdivision restrictions that altered voting rights of members, but upholding extensive alterations of amendments permitting association to acquire and
operate a golf course). Note that in this case the original provisions stated that
no amendments could be effectuated that would "deprive any member of rights
and privileges then existing, or to amend the by-laws as to effect a fundamental
change in the policies of the association." Compare Scoville v. Springpark
Homeowner's Ass'n, 784 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (discussing subdivision restrictions which allow homeowners to totally remove restrictions to all
lots if passed by a seventy-five percent vote).
256. Couch v. Southern Methodist Univ., 10 S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1972).
257. 566 N.E.2d 1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (restriction of unit owners' leasing rights).
258. Id. at 1277.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1278.
261. Id.
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to access as a result of the amendment. Included therein,
by necessity, is not only a consideration of whether the
surrounding circumstances render a restriction on an
owner's use of his or her property reasonable, but also a
determination of whether the rule has been reasonably
implemented.., the issue is not only whether plaintiff
reasonably may restrict defendant's right to lease her
unit, but also whether plaintiff reasonably may do so retroactively. 262
The court was not inclined to conclude that the defendant unit owner had an absolute right to retain the right to
lease her unit. The unit owner contended that she had invested in reliance on the expectation.26 3 The court, however,
remanded for a determination of the reasonableness of applying the no-renting policy to her case. 4
B. The Business Judgment Test
A select number of cases and authorities have maintained that common interest association rules ought to be
measured by rules analogous to those applied to a board of
directors in a private corporation. 65 In Papalexiou v. Tower
West Condominiums,211 the court stated that the
"reasonableness" rule, as applied in New Jersey, was the
'
67
If the
equivalent of the corporate business judgment rule.
266 The "rule" in this
rule is enacted in good faith, it is valid.
case was an association board decision that emergency conditions existed to justify a special assessment.2 6 9 The bylaws
gave authority to the board to elect to use such an assess262. Id.
263. Worthinglen Condominium Owners' Ass'n v. Brown, 566 N.E.2d 1275,
1278 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
264. Id. at 1279.
265. Rywalt v. Writer Corp., 526 P.2d 316 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974) is commonly
cited for the proposition that the business judgment rule should be the sole determinant of the validity of the decisions of association boards. The court in
that case, however, also evaluated whether the board had the authority to
carry out its decision under the bylaws. Id. Such an inquiry has led other
states to evaluate board determinations under the reasonableness test. The
fact that the court saw no reason to question whether the board had authority
to make its decision here does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the
only relevant question in measuring the validity of a board's judgment was that
it had authority to make a decision in good faith. Id.
266. 401 A.2d 280 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979).
267. Id. at 285.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 284.
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ment in response to emergency conditions. The board concluded that such an assessment was the best response to a
massive deferred maintenance situation.27 ° Unit owners argued that under the bylaws the board lacked authority to
impose the assessment. The fundamental question was
whether an emergency actually existed. 2 1 The court essentially held that where such a determination is made in good
faith, the court will undertake a separate analysis to set
aside the association judgment.272
The "business judgment" rule might appear to be a major
departure from the "reasonableness" test. The differences,
however, are subtle; they are minor violations in the degree
of deference paid to an association board's judgment. The
business judgment rule presumes that the board has the
authority to make the questioned determination. In reaching
its conclusion on this point, a reviewing court, can make a
determination about the association's basic nature and the
expectations of its members. If the court concludes that the
members had not given the board the right to make a particular determination the court will never reach the question
of whether the board's resolution of the issue was protected
as a "business judgment."
The reasonableness test, on the other hand, may
authorize a court not only to evaluate the delegated authority
of the board, but also to evaluate independently the correctness of the board's decision. In doing so, the court is likely to
take into account the fact that the board is closer to the
problem and will naturally give some deference to judgments
made by the board. The presumption of validity, however, is
slightly less than under the business judgment rule than under the "reasonableness test."
When evaluating whether courts ought to recognize unit
owner expectations in enforcing changes in the policies of a

270. Id.
271. Id. at 286.
272. Papalexiou v. Tower West Condominiums, 401 A.2d 280, 285-86 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979). See generally, Jeffrey Goldberg, Community Association Use Restrictions:Applying the Business Judgment Doctrine, 64 CHI-KENT
L. REV. 653 (1988). A leading New York decision applying the test is Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 553 N.E.2d. 1317 (N.Y. 1990). See
also, Randolph C. Gwirtzman, Note, An Exception to the Levandusky Business
Judgment Rule: Owner and ShareholderInterests in Condominium and CooperativeBoard Decisions, 14 CARDOzo L. REV. 1021 (1993).
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common ownership development, the differences between the
business judgment test and the reasonableness test may be
less than the ordinary differences. Both tests assume that
the court will first reach a determination as to whether an
association board has a right to make a rule in a particular
area. Unit owners might have an expectation that certain
conditions will not to be changed, such as restrictions on
leasing. In that case, the court may have to evaluate the legitimacy of the board's authority to address the issue before
determining whether the board did so satisfactorily. Only after deciding that the board has the power to make the decision, will the court confront how much deference to afford
that decision. Thus, under both tests a court must evaluate
the question of vested expectations before it reaches the issues where the test dictates a difference in approach.
Furthermore, even after the preliminary determination,
it is possible that, under either test, the court will take
vested expectations into account. The reasonableness test, as
formulated by the Worthinglen court, would permit the court
greater latitude in evaluating the legitimacy of the board's
application of its revised policy to an individual unit owner
Even
specially and adversely affected by the change." '
though a court using the "business judgment" test might not
take into account the impact of the decision as part of its review of the decision itself, it may take such concerns into account in determining what form of relief ought to be granted.
Some courts would not apply the reasonableness test to
changes instituted by unit owner vote.27 Similarly, the business judgment rule focuses exclusively on the conduct of the
board members and does not purport to provide a basis for
evaluating the question of voted changes.
In sum, the question of whether courts ought to recognize vested expectations of unit owners goes beyond the
choice between the business judgment rule or reasonableness
test. Regardless of the test used, the courts must still evaluate whether there are expectations that deserve special protection.

273. Worthinglen Condominium Owners' Ass'n v. Brown, 566 N.E.2d 1275
(Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
274. See, e.g., Couch v. Southern Methodist Univ., 10 S.W.2d 973 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1928).
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C. The PublicAgency Model
The leading case of White Egret Condominium, Inc. v.
27 and number of
Franklin
commentators have suggested that
decision making in common interest associations ought to be
regulated and reviewed by standards generally applicable to
municipal corporations.276 Their arguments' assert that procedural and substantive due process guarantees provided by
the United States Constitution ought to apply to such associations. Such arguments relate primarily to the method of
decision making, rather than to the ultimate decisions. Of
course, a commonly recognized feature of public land use
regulation is the protection afforded to the pre-existing nonconforming use-a vested expectation of continued ability to
conduct a use instituted before a zoning change. Further, the
public agency model would recognize the concept of protection against "takings," some protection against the majority
imposing upon certain individuals the cost of a general benefit.277 Determining the level of protection to afford these
types of interests under the public agency model is beyond
the scope of this article. It is sufficient to point out that
there is nothing in the public agency model that is inconsistent with the types of protections afforded to vested expectations in any of the cases discussed. Each doctrine, and each
form of protection, could easily find a correlative in public
agency law.
D. The "Freedomof Contract"Argument
A number of commentators have argued that there
should be virtually no regulation of association decision
making except to the extent that the court identifies language in declarations or other basic documents that permits
the decision to be made.278 The argument is close to that un275. 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979) (appearing to apply Constitutional due process and equal protection standards to enforcement of a "no-children" rule).
276. See generally Katharine Rosenberry, Condominium and Homeowners
Associations, Should They be Treated Like "Mini-Governments"? 8 ZONING &
PLAN. L. REP. 153 (1985).
277. Wayne S. Hyatt & Jo Anne P. Stubblefield, The Identity Crisis of Community Associations: In Search of the Appropriate Analogy, 27 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TRUST J. 587 (1993).
278. Wayne S. Hyatt, The Business Judgment Rule and Community Associations: Recasting the Perfect Analogy, 1 CAI's J. OF COMMUNITY ASSN L. 2
(1998).
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derlying the business judgment rule. One would assume that
courts who follow it recognize some implicit provision that
authorized decisions must be made in good faith.279
Perhaps the most significant difference that likely would
flow from a rigid application of the freedom of contract argument, as opposed to the business judgment test, is that
courts would provide complete contractual enforcement to
each and every determination made in accordance with the
written standards of the association. The business judgment
test focuses on the validity of the root decision, but does not
necessarily remove enforcement determinations from the
court's discretion. An absolute freedom of contract approach,
however, would deprive courts of enforcement discretion.
There is much to be said for the freedom of contract notion as applied to real property interests generally. Where it
can be assumed that the original association agreement was
the result of a true market decision by parties with the necessary knowledge and sophistication to make an informed
choice, such an approach even in the area of common interest
associations is preferable. Most common interest development law to date, however, has arisen in the context of residential communities. Most home purchasers should learn
about the restrictions applicable to their properties, and the
ways in which those restrictions can change. The author,
with considerable experience in counseling unit purchasers
in restricted communities, can attest that most home purchasers do not learn about these matters before they purchase. In many cases, a full understanding of all the implications of common interest ownership is beyond their
intellectual or experiential grasp.
To advocate that courts cannot apply an approach to associations designed to provide support for a smoothly operating marketplace, is not to say that courts should have unlimited discretion rewrite all the rules. Where courts
substitute their judgments of appropriateness for the judgments reflected in association decisions, they frustrate the
legitimate expectations of unit owners who do make educated
and thoughtful decisions. Where special hardships arise,
however, an absolute enforcement approach will lead to consequences that may deter investment in common interest as279. Id.
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sociations. Moreover, such an inflexible approach is unlikely
to fulfill the true expectations even of those who expect the
courts to enforce generally the policies legitimately established within the association.
One way to recognize vested expectations, notwithstanding application of a freedom of contract test, would be to
read the original documents narrowly in order to protect legitimate expectations and special concerns. Where the language is clear, no protection would be warranted. Such an
approach is inconsistent with the notion that parties who enter into a contract have a duty to make their special needs
and concerns patent; and ought not rely upon non-standard
implied, readings. The documents should be read for their
plain meaning, with no particular "tilt" for, or against, any
group.
In sum, a true "freedom of contract" approach likely is
inconsistent with the protection of vested expectations of the
type discussed above. To that extent, it is an inadequate approach for addressing particular issues of enforcement of
changed policies in common interest communities.
CONCLUSION: A PROPOSED APPROACH-Focus ON REMEDY
There is no basis to argue that purchasers of units
within common interest communities have an expectation
that there will be no changes at all. The relationships created in most common interest communities are too complex
them to continue unchanged for substantial periods of time.
Most unit owners know or should know that. The presence of
an association, with its boards, committees, policies, and
rules also would demonstrate to any unit purchaser that a
certain amount of discretion has been vested in elected leaders. Thus, sometimes decisions made through this process
will not meet the preferences of each unit owner.
In the context of commercial developments, it is likely
that a discussion about the existence of vested rights begin
and end with the declaration or equivalent "community charter:" a subdivision map with restrictive covenants or other
formative documents. If that document contains provisions
for change through membership vote, or the creation of representative bodies to effectuate change, courts have no reason to intrude upon the contract rights and expectations created therein. Courts' sole function, in this circumstance, is
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interpretive.
In exercising their interpretive function, a number of
courts have taken the position that a fair interpretation of
the various provisions for change appearing in common interest community charters is that such changes ought to be
"reasonable." In the commercial context, this interpretive
approach is unwarranted and dangerous. It is fair to assume
that most decisions made by participants in a commercial
venture, are made with a single economic motive."' All investors participate with the expectation that each of the
other investors will make decisions in their own individual
economic best interest.
There is no reason to believe that courts are better
equipped to make such determinations than are the parties
themselves. There is danger in allowing the courts to do so.
When courts routinely substitute their views of "commercial
reasonableness" for those of the parties to a long term real
estate investment, society pays a price in terms of predictability of result. The consequence is that deals that may represent the best and most efficient reallocation of resources for
the public interest will not get made-the costs of making the
deal become too high. The decisions of commercial real estate investors depend upon limiting the number of variables
affecting risk. Certainly the danger that a court may substitute its judgment for the business judgment of the affected
parties is a significant expansion of risk. When parties cannot have predictability of result in their contract language,
they must negotiate for substitute means of achieving predictability.281
The argument can be made that many commercial real
280. Where business decisions are made with malicious intent, there are
adequate special remedies, such as tortious interference remedies, to address
such problems. Wholesale rereading of the language of every community charter is not necessary to protect against malicious, anti competitive or other socially undesirable decisions in commercial common interest communities.
281. Real estate relationships are hardly unique in their reliance upon predictability of contract in order to reduce uncertainty. But many commercial
relationships in which modem courts or lawmakers (such as the drafters of the
Uniform Commercial Code) have elected to impose duties of good faith and fair
dealing or other general "reasonableness" requirements do not arise as clearly
from individually bargained transactions. "Marketplace morality" is an assumed part of such agreements, and many understandings are left unstated
because of this. This environment is less true of real'estate investments generally than it is of other types of commercial relationships-such as sales of
goods.
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estate investors, in common interest developments, do not
bargain over, or even read, the terms of their community
charters. Others do read and rely upon them. All investors
know, or should know, that these documents will have an
impact on their long term investment activities. An investor's choice not to read them constitutes a bargaining decision in and of itself. There is a short term savings in bargaining time and the cost of legal advice. The investor,
however, ought to be expected to pay the price if at some future time, the documents will lead to an undesirable result.
To protect the investor from this untoward future consequence is to punish inappropriately those who did read and
rely upon the language in the community charter.
Although the same argument made above can and has
been made 82 with regard to residential communities, human
experience suggests that it has little foundation in reality.
For the majority of investment decisions regarding common
interest communities, there is neither available information
nor opportunity to bargain with terms of the community
charter.28 Some states, including California, require the provision of extensive disclosure documents in connection with
marketing of these interests. In many states, including California, home buyers are neither required nor encouraged to
obtain legal counsel to advise them. Residential real estate
is part of our "consumer economy." Most purchasers of goods
and services trust government and blind luck to insure that
they get what they want and are protected from what they do
not.
There is some temptation to suggest that consumers who
are careless and neglect to anticipate that their common interest communities will change in ways that they find undesirable, should have no more protection against such changes
than the commercial investor. The justification in the commercial context, however, is that other investors have read
and understood the community charter, and have invested in
the expectation of its precise application. This is not so likely

282. See Susan F. French, The Constitutionof a Private Residential Government Should Include a Bill of Rights, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV 345 (1992)
(arguing that unit owners in fact would respond to community charters that
protect their legitimate expectations, and thus invest more readily in a community that has such protections).
283. HYATT, HOMEOWNER ASSOcIATIONS, supra note 28, § 9.05, at 296.
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to be true in residential communities. The courts rendering
many of the decisions discussed in this article are like as
shepherds guiding sheep who do not understand their legal
environment and, as citizens and investors, need and expect
that governmental organs, including courts, will insure reasonable behavior.
Some courts go beyond the mere protection from change
in residential common interests. They recognize that there is
little reason to believe that investors really understand the
rules, as they exist at time of investment, view their function
as evaluating each and every provision of the community
charter and rules to determine what is reasonable.284 Some
scholars maintain that a better approach to the problem is to
impose new conditions and requirements on the process by
which rules are made and enforced, to protect against arbitrary and oppressive decisions, yet permit community decision making.28
There is some validity to the view of those who would
subject all common interest community decisions and policies
to special judicial scrutiny. At bottom, it is a question of consumer protection. Due to the fact that there has been much
legislative attention given to the issue, however, it is unclear
that courts should go beyond the policy decisions made by
legislatures. Although many common interest investors do
not base their investment decisions upon the absolute enforceability of the terms of their community charters, some
do. Further, even in the residential area, a legitimate concern exists as to whether substituting of the judgment of
courts for those reached by community processes actually
will result in improvement sufficient to justify the dispute
resolution cost. Judges make bad decisions too!286
The survey undertaken for this article has identified a
number of situations in which courts have identified a special
interest in protecting unit owners in common interest com284. See supra Part III.A.
285. See supra Part III.B.
286. One is hard pressed to understand how the several courts in the
Nahrstedt decision could conclude that members of a community had no legitimate basis for prohibiting cats. Although some cats, properly supervised and
maintained, may have no negative impact in a community, there is no assurance that all cats that are permitted once the prohibition is voided will receive
such proper care or that the association would be able to enforce such levels of
care once cats are permitted.
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munities against unforeseen change.28 7 The protections have
rarely been absolute. Nevertheless, the courts have recognized a legitimate interest in protecting common interest usage from reallocation, including: pet restrictions, leasing restriction, and other changes that have a significant impact on
expectations of individual investors. This recognition is evident even where such changes reflect appropriate community
judgments as to what the community should adopt as uniform rules.
Many courts have upheld reallocating in the name of
uniform community behavior. Nevertheless, there is room
for compromise. The compromise could occur in an area of
law which has traditionally been within the discretion of the
courts, even where express contract rights are recognizedthe question of enforcement. If courts were to take expectations into account in reviewing the remedies available for
breach of common interest provisions, they would be less
concerned with whether the provisions breached, were themselves, reasonable. Courts could leave the ultimate determination of community policy to community decision makers,
yet carve out exceptions for enforcement based upon special
circumstances. Included would be the degree to which justifiable individual expectations have been frustrated by the
change in question.
In determining whether an individual unit owner should
enjoy relief from a changed policy, courts should take a number of factors into account. In light of the many of the factors
that courts now use in evaluating the reasonableness or validity of the rule in general, a few suggestions are set forth
below:
1. Does the change have a significant impact on the individual's use and enjoyment of the individual common
interest investment?
2. Does the affected individual have reasonable opportunities to mitigate that impact?
3. Does evidence exists that the individual had reason to
believe that the conditions existing at the time of investment could change?
4. Does the change affects the community generally, or

287. See supra Part III.
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only a few individuals?
5. Would injury to the community environment would
result from recognizing a vested expectation in this
individual?
6. Would injury to the autonomy of the community and
its processes would result from recognizing the vested
expectation?
A distinction between voted and board-adopted changes
is not suggested. Rather, the focus should be on the impact
of the change on the individual and the benefit to the community. Courts should exercise great restraint in reviewing
the validity of decisions made in a proper fashion pursuant to
delegated authority. Even where the community has voted
(less than unanimous vote) to alter the rules, the questions of
impact on the individual and justification for the community
remain the same. The outcome should not differ simply because the change was instituted by vote of unit owners.
Nor is a distinction between changes involving use rights
in common areas and other issues suggested in this article.
If the community adopts a policy affecting use of common areas, it does not necessarily affect ownership. Statutory prohibitions on the alteration of interests in common elements
need not be read to prohibit the community absolutely from
electing to allocate common elements to particular uses, even
individualized uses. Where parking spaces are reallocated,
or access rights are restricted, there is a significant impact
on investment expectation. Thus, there ought to be a high
level of justification where, for instance, a unit owner is given
private use of a common element area that provides exclusive
access to that unit and has no benefit to any other owner,
there is no reason to uphold blindly some vested property interest in unit owners objecting to the change; there is no alteration in actual ownership and the private use could be discontinued by the same process if community needs or
perceptions were to evolve in the future.
Protection of a vested expectation need not result in the
wholesale destruction of a community policy, or even a longterm reduction in uniform treatment. An individual, for instance, could be permitted to keep a pet the individual maintained at the time the pet restriction was adopted, or even to
replace that pet. The individual, however, might not be permitted to acquire additional pets. Even if an individual were
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generally permitted to keep pets, the individual may not be
permitted to sell the unit unencumbered by the pet restriction. The investor would be hard pressed to argue that there
is an expectation in the resale value of the unit as a "pet
friendly" unit in a "pet hostile" community.
In some cases the community needs will require that a
validly authorized change be absolutely enforced, even if
there is significant injury to individual expectations. For example, this might occur where common element parking
spaces are allocated to individual unit owners. Such a
change, under the decided cases, would be beyond the power
of most common ownership communities. The rationale that
it is a change in ownership percentage in common elements;
a rationale not espoused here.
Such a change, where
adopted according to an unbiased and properly authorized
process, should be viewed merely as a use rule. As such, the
rule could always be changed again by the same process, and
creates no ownership rights. The rule is simply the community's determination as to how to make the best use of the
common elements within its control.288
Where the legal action is one for injunction or declaratory relief, traditional equitable functions, courts have always exercised broad equitable discretion in forming remedies. Those remedies may in fact recognize and avoid special
hardships that could result from rigid enforcement of legal
rights. 8 9 In addressing only remedies, courts would exercise
the traditional function, without engaging in rewriting community policies to prohibit practices expressly permitted in
288. The author would not make the same judgment about changes in common elements that would exclude an owner from beneficial use of a lobby for its
commercial units, as occurred in Ridgely Condominium Ass'n v. Smyrniodis,
681 A.2d 494 (Md. 1996). Here, the author would conclude that general powers
to control usage of common elements should not be read to avoid valuable, access rights. The difference between the two situations, however, might easily
be addressed on a case by case basis at the remedy level. There is no reason to
adopt a general policy that communities cannot identify certain common elements as available only to certain classes of owners. It might be permissible,
for instance, for a community to decide that tennis courts are to be used only by
owners when they occupy their units, and not when they have rented them to
others. See Liebler v. Point Loma Tennis Club, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783 (Ct. App.
1995) (holding that a rule restricting use of tennis courts was valid where declaration provided that association could adopt "reasonable rules" to govern use
of common areas).
289. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 8.31-8.32 (2d

ed. 1993).
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the community charter.29
Special problems will arise, of course, where the community charter provides its own mechanism for enforcement of
rules against violators. In Nahrstedt, for instance, the dispute arose after the community association had assessed and
attempted to collect penalty assessments for violation of association policies.291 Nevertheless, authorizing judicial discretion at the level of enforcement, even where the result
may be non-enforcement of certain discrete association policies, is far preferable to upsetting community decisions completely.
There is no doubt that the special problems of common
interest communities require the sacrifice of individual
autonomy to the collective will. Where regulation of the use
of residential property is concerned, however, there are many
ownership interests which courts traditionally have valued.
They ought not be lost by mistake or inadvertence."' In residential real estate, especially common interest communities,
there is a profound difference between technical legal rights
and consumer expectations. 92 Our society has encouraged
and preserved a sense of security in consumer investors. The
courts have bolstered that security by blunting the impact of
94
legal rules inconsistent with consumer expectations.
Where the needs of the community can still be met, the
courts can play a useful function in fashioning remedies that
recognize legitimately enacted community policies-even
when they depart from consumer expectations. In so doing,
court can preserve expectations to a reasonable extent.
Crafting such remedies is essentially the exercise of traditional equitable discretion. The needs of the common interest community invite the application of judicial wisdom at
this stage of community-owner disputes, without regard to
whether courts have a broader role to play in reviewing association policy making generally.

290.
291.
1994).
292.
293.

Id.
Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal.
10 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 22,

Id.

294. See id.
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